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1 The importance of an Arendtian legacy
Very early in her Philosophical Diary, Arendt wrote: ‘If we leave aside
the faculty of judgment, everything turns into vertigo’.1 Already by
1951, she was puzzled by the need of judgment and by the difficulties
of understanding what judgment is. Two things, over with which she
would be pondering all her life, underlie her acknowledgment of that
need and this perplexity. In the first place, there was her conviction, later
increased and further elaborated, that judgment, understood as the
capacity for distinguishing right from wrong, underlies the lack of
response to the swelling totalitarian historical processes that took place
in the first half of the past century. Arendt lived through those dark ages
in an exercise of understanding these processes and, for so doing,
struggled against the for-grantedness of current political understandings
or ideologies that, to her thought, missed the nature of the evils of
contemporary society; and she condemned their underlying philosophi-
cal hindrances – so she thought them – that prevented understanding and
led action to so many blind alleys. But, in the second place, the need of
judgment and the difficulties in understanding it frame her perplexity
regarding the ambivalent, Janus-status of judgment itself. Judgment is a
normative discriminatory capacity that relates, on the one hand, to the
distinct faculty of thinking or vita contemplativa because it brings into
the world the understanding and mapping of what right and wrong are;
but thinking, nevertheless, has to have a free and unconditioned status
as a personal exercise of rationality, even in solitude,2 unconstrained by
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the circumstances of action. Thus, on the other hand, judgment, as a
faculty that, at a specifically concerned distance, pertains to the specta-
tor and not to the actor, remains also segregated from immediate action
and politics, albeit it has to frame them if its discriminatory powers are
to have any function. As a distinct faculty, judgment – the faculty that
remained almost absent in dark times – is required as an exercise of
concernment and immediacy but requires, at the same time, the peculiar
distance that only theory can give. Arendt gave constant attention in her
writings throughout her life to this perplexing predicament of judgment
and her late systematic return to the Third Critique and to Kant’s politi-
cal writings has been shown to be a hidden thread to all her philoso-
phical endeavors.3
In this article I will not be dealing with Arendt’s and Kant’s theories
of judgment and their known difficulties, but will take heed of the afore-
mentioned Arendtian insight regarding the need of judgment, an insight
that I take still to be, in mutated historical circumstances, absolutely
relevant. I would like to suggest that the need for judgment in order to
tell right from wrong, in Arendt’s terms, can be mirrored in Rawls’
proposal of the need for theory, or political philosophy, in order to tell
just from unjust institutions. Certainly, both needs, of Arendtian judgment
and of Rawlsian theory, are framed in very different philosophical
approaches – and specifically, in parallel and not coincident returns to
Kantian practical philosophy – but it may not be mistaken to say that
it is the same drive which moves both theoretical enterprises and, what
may be more significant, tints them with a host of similar strategies and
problems. Nevertheless, there is a hard philosophical problem, the roots
of which can be traced to Kant’s analyses of practical rationality, that
seems to differentiate Arendt’s and Rawls’ approaches. While Arendt
tried to understand Kant as developing a new type of philosophical
understanding of the political that in crucial points breaks away with
the understanding of moral rationality as determinate judgments, I would
suggest Rawls’ intention is to read back into Kant’s moral philosophy,
to the realm of the Second Critique, the reflective turn that the Third
Critique introduced in the realm of the aesthetic or, more precisely, to
discover that already Kant’s analysis of practical reason, and sometimes
pace his own examples, is reflectively modeled. The important, philoso-
phical issue here is the status of norms or principles in guiding action
and the process of their justification. Arendt stressed a certain paral-
lelism between Kant’s treatment of aesthetic judgments, with which we
judge when we do not have general rules, and the historical moments
she lived, which, in a somehow similar way, were characterized by ‘the
total collapse of moral and religious standards among people who to all
appearances had always firmly believed in them’.4 Her interest in Kant’s
sensus communis is, like Kant’s, the urge to dispel with any arbitrariness
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in such relevant matters and the possibility of forming discriminating
judgments – and thus norms and principles – that could guide action.
Rawls, on his side, starts with a less suspicious and more robust notion
of the guiding role of norms or principles as would be required by his
goal of articulating a theory of just institutions, but understands reflec-
tively the process of arriving at their justification as determining their very
validity. We can, thus, picture Arendt as trying to articulate judgment
in the search for principles, but without taking their definition or their
validity for granted, and even being suspicious of their alleged role, and
Rawls as not doubting their guiding function, but acknowledging the role
judgment plays in their justification. But in spite of these important
differences,5 some important parallelisms come to the fore: both regard
politics as a sphere of action, as a type of institutions and practices, that
needs, first, to be understood as the realm of plurality and diversity and
that can be understood, second, as an exercise of a peculiar type of
rationality – i.e. practical rationality – that can be differentiated from
other rational enterprises. More specifically, both center their attention
in the idea of judgment as a clue to that type of political and practical
rationality and, in different though somehow parallel ways, both relate
the idea of judgment with what each takes the appeal to theory to mean.
With Arendt’s approach in the background, I will be pursuing the
ways in which the need for theory articulates itself in Rawls’ version of
the problem and pinpoint how the Kantian mould of reflective judgment
gives form to the construction of a theory of justice via the mechanism
of reflective equilibrium. Thus, I will not be going into the particulars of
Rawls’ theory – i.e. of the set of reasons and arguments that character-
ize his substantive liberal proposal – but will focus on the architecture
of his global design that exhibits, in the field of normative political
philosophy, the work of reflective rationality.6 I will suggest that the
need for theory so devised has constantly to move between the demands
of theory itself – the social contract tradition as understood by Rawls
– and the demands of action that in this case are understood as the guide
our considered judgments lend to our understanding of the social world.
A final goal of my analysis will be to suggest that a particular grasp of
the lessons of historical experience, as a way of fulfilling the need for
theory that lies in the heart of the exercise of judgment, is what renders
theoretically attractive the Rawlsian proposal and what constantly
underlies the construction of his theory. His approach, which can be
taken as paramount of other similar philosophical theories of the last
30 years, is – sometimes with instabilities that are not minor – an
exercise of a certain kind of theory that frames judgments and is devised
to enhance them, but that relies on particular, historical exercises of
judgment in order to articulate itself even as theory and to show its very
plausibility.
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2 The need for theory
In his justification of the fundamental ideas of political liberalism, and
in explaining the use of the abstract conceptions that build up its frame-
work, Rawls addresses a certain type of skepticism regarding the theor-
etical effort required in political philosophy. Although PL consciously
limits itself to the political, not metaphysical, even there any effort to
reach rational agreements will need to envisage abstract concepts and
theories. ‘In political philosophy’, he states, ‘the work of abstraction is
set in motion by deep political conflicts’ (PL, 44). Only an ideological
or visionary stance, he continues, would fail to experience such conflicts.
And he adds:
We turn to political philosophy when our shared political understandings,
as Walzer might say, break down, and equally when we are torn within
ourselves. We recognize this if we imagine Alexander Stephens rejecting
Lincoln’s appeal to the abstractions of natural right and replying to him
by saying: the North must respect the South’s shared political understand-
ing on the slavery question. Surely the reply to this will lead into political
philosophy. (PL, 44 f.)
It is important to note that Rawls is trying to articulate the need for theory
at two different but confluent levels: a first level of the immediate politi-
cal life and a second level regarding the type of theory or philosophy to
which we appeal when dealing with conflict and disagreement. At the
first level, closer to immediate political life, he seems to be arguing that
we cannot resort to the taken-for-granted character of communitarily
based values, for this character is, precisely, what is questioned: as it
breaks down when conflict arises any appeal to the justificatory role of
shared beliefs would fall below the importance and the reality of the
conflict itself. Certainly, not every political conflict or social disagree-
ment may need a full-flown theoretical enterprise, as Rawls’ work might
exemplify in our days or as Hobbes’, Locke’s or Rousseau’s did in earlier
times. The need for theory refers to those, in Rawls’ wording, ‘long-
lasting controversies’, whose depth and whose resolution have framed the
basic understanding of our democratic societies. Rawls’ two recurrent
examples, to the exemplary character of which I will return, if briefly,
in the last part of this article, are, on the one hand, the freedom of
conscience and the right of resistance that after the Reformation became
the matrices of theoretical and political liberalism, and, on the other, the
extensive debates that, as the above quote shows, divided North American
political culture regarding slavery and the nature of the union between
the states of the young republic. Both examples draw us to specific
historical experiences of conflict and disagreement and to very different
historical and cultural processes in the diverse western traditions, but a
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general point could be made regarding them that puts into light one of
Rawls’ central insights that tints all his philosophical enterprise: the
acknowledgment of the fact that certain types of conflict unveil that
the diversity of comprehensive, philosophical and moral doctrines is a
permanent feature of a democratic public culture, a diversity the public
expression of which can only by barred by the use of force. This struc-
tural feature, of historical and social character, parallels a second type
of structural diversity, more general and of epistemological nature, that
springs from what Rawls terms the ‘burdens of judgment’ and that could
be summarized in the ulterior fact that ‘our most important judgments
are made under conditions where it is not to be expected that consci-
entious persons with full powers of reason, even after free discussion,
will all arrive at the same conclusion’ (PL, 58).
The former structural plurality of doctrines or this latter diversity
in the appraisal of values and beliefs, need not express themselves in
terms of explicit conflict or controversies, but underlie those that are
most relevant in our political self-understandings and explain how such
conflicts could not be resolved via the continuous reiteration of one of
the doctrines, judgments or beliefs in question nor, even less, via the
imposition of one of them over the others. It would be naïf not to
acknowledge that these options have been frequently the case in history,
but – and this is a crucial, Enlightenment insight – in the long run they
prove to be socially harmful and unsustainable. In order for a conflict
or dispute to be resolved, some modification in the order of the first-
order doctrines or beliefs is necessary and, Rawls’ suggestion, this is one
of the roles philosophy – and in political affairs, political philosophy –
has. Philosophy helps in this need to make explicit the reasons and
understandings that underlie the different positions and, thus, to turn
the taken-for-granted character they might initially have had into explicit
considered judgments. Nevertheless, this explicitness does not cancel
their diversity – it may even strengthen it – and the plurality of doctrines
and judgments will continue to be a structural trait in democratic
conditions. This first level in the appeal to theoretical considerations has
only pointed to the need of different doctrines to become reflectively
aware of the plurality in which they are already immersed and has not,
obviously, solved the conflict in which they might be engaged. Maybe
not all doctrines – as would be the case of tyrannical ideologies or
visionary doctrines – pass this initial test of reflexivity that would render
them, in Rawls’ terminology, as reasonable comprehensive doctrines,
and a serious problem thus arises concerning how to address these non-
reasonable positions. Leaving now aside Rawls’ position regarding the
limits of toleration, it must be underscored that a constant effort in his
analyses, and one of his best contributions, from TJ to his last writings
on public reason, is to push forward theoretical arguments that dissolve
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the initial resistance to the acknowledgment of plurality on the part of
different comprehensive doctrines or against the parallel move of trying
to deny or dissolve the structural diversity of reasonable doctrines via
what could be considered reductive understandings of the role of philoso-
phy in dealing with public disagreements and in understanding them
(and both utilitarianism and intuitionism could be taken, in different
ways, to exemplify such a move at a philosophical level).
This last consideration takes us to the second level in which the need
for theory can be analysed, the characterization of the type of theory that
can be appealed to after acknowledging the structural nature of (reason-
able) pluralism. But we could, first, point to the significant parallelism
between Rawls’ understanding how theory is needed and Arendt’s convic-
tion that politics starts with the acknowledgment of the plurality of men,
as she would put it, because political action is what happens between
different individuals, in their shared, but diverse, lives. Where Rawls,
with an approach that is more structural in bent and with the intent of
defining just institutions, focuses on doctrines or structures of belief,
Arendt underscores the fact of the plurality of persons; but both take
these pluralisms as the relevant starting point of their respective investi-
gations and both would stress that this acknowledgment of pluralism is
at the core of democracy. But, still further, the acknowledgment of this
pluralist predicament determines the type of complex, rational justifi-
cation that any doctrine aware of pluralism has to adopt. For a doctrine
or set of beliefs to be justified one could turn, internally, to the ways in
which it appeals to its founding reasons. As an exercise of deliberative
rationality – to which I will return, if briefly, in the following section in
analysing narrow reflective equilibrium – it makes clear for she or he
who sustains such a doctrine or set of convictions what is implied in it,
and why: it settles, so to say, the internal architecture of the building of
our beliefs. But this internal sense of justification does not suffice if
structural pluralism is seriously taken into account; it needs a further
step, that of extended thinking, to put it in Kantian terms, i.e. the under-
standing of one’s doctrine in the light of different sets of beliefs. We then
need also a type of external justification even to make sense of our
internal understandings and, to continue the metaphor just used, city
planning is required to understand the very habitableness of our own
building. This seems to demand an understanding of what a valid reason
might amount to be: it must be a shareable reason between different sets
of beliefs. Rawls’ version – that already embodies his distinction between
the two sides of rationality, the rational and the reasonable – is:
[J]ustification is argument addressed to those who disagree with us, or to
ourselves when we are of two minds. It presumes a clash of views between
persons or within one person, and seeks to convince others, or ourselves, of
the reasonableness of the principles upon which our claims and judgments
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are founded. Being designed to reconcile by reason, justification proceeds
from what all parties in the discussion hold in common. Ideally, to justify
a conception of justice to someone is to give him a proof of its principles
from premises that we both accept, these principles having in turn conse-
quences that match our considered judgments. (TJ, 508)
We might ask ourselves if, with this appeal to common, shared meanings,
we are not back to the point we started with, if it might not be the case
that questioning our shared understandings is, thus, an impossible, if
not a dangerous, task and, finally, if to ‘reconcile by reason’ is just to
sew together again what conflict tore apart. This communitarian inter-
pretation could be answered by pointing out that the fabric of our living
together is not the same after introducing the acknowledgment of plural-
ism and the external interpretation of what justification is. However
dense our shared values might be taken to be – and communitarian and
liberal interpretations will strongly differ regarding this issue – they
already have had to incorporate a theoretical and reflective interpret-
ation of what it is at all for them to be shared. This first level of the
need of theory does not, then, leave things unchanged.
To return to Rawls’ second type of appeal to abstraction and theory,
it should be noted that not all types of political philosophy could match
the task it must undertake as a second-level theory that explains how,
and according to what tenets, we can reconstruct the broken fabric of
social life. Theory, in this second sense, is both an interpretation of the
reasons and dimensions of conflict and the advancement of what types
of solution might be adopted to end it. These possible solutions can be
taken to be sets of articulate general and basic reasons all the parties
involved could adopt should they desire to arrive at a new understand-
ing of their situation that would end an unbearable conflict. In short,
we could understand these sets of basic reasons as sets of principles, the
nature of which need not, nevertheless, be understood as ultimate (or as
metaphysical, i.e. they need not contain a full theory of reality) but as
tailored to the dimensions and the type of conflict we are involved in.
We can have theories of very different levels of abstraction and which
can cover very different fields of our knowledge and interests. The just
mentioned appeal to principles is, nevertheless, centered in the issues
under discussion – to the moral semantics at stake, as I will call it in
the last section of this article – albeit we could continue to engage in
further investigations and reflections regarding related topics. One of the
tasks of political philosophy would be, first, to establish some boundary
conditions of the theories that might be relevant (what they should or
should not contemplate) and, second, to focus on the discussion of the
available theories that are candidates for explaining what we are engaged
in when we dispute deep issues that concern us and what the solutions
to our conflicts might be. Thus, not only the reflective awareness of
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pluralism and the external justification of our doctrine are required,
though an interpretation of such elements must be a necessary constituent
of any second-level theory we might envisage. In order to avoid rela-
tivism or passivity regarding the issue at hand, we seem also to need a
certain normative capacity on the side of the type of philosophy we
might subscribe. If we are divided regarding an important, deep issue –
as in the case of slavery and basic liberties – in which our political self-
understanding is at stake, our engaging in discussion and our appeal to
theory is the search for some type of solution that relates to actions that
can be taken in order to implement it. Theory, in this sense, not only
illuminates the depth of disagreements and conflicts, nor helps only in
acknowledging pluralism; it not only describes our predicament: it
demands, or is thought to demand, some type of guide for actions in
the way of principles, as I understood them before. We should note that
even the shift between Rawls’ two major works, TJ and PL – a shift that
has as one of its roots an effort, like the one I have just described, at
tailoring theory to the specific nature of the political – does not amount
to a denial or an abandonment of theory. In fixing its attention on the
political, the practical role theory accomplishes may even stronger.
This last remark might be too general and abstract, but points to a
crucial feature that relates directly to the understanding of this, Kantian,
appeal to judgment: theories do not act, and only figuratively are said
to be in conflict; only persons and social agents do. The appeal to theory
in understanding our social predicament and the type of rationality there
involved must be an appeal to types of sets of reasons or principles that,
along with the relevant perceptions and adequate emotions, can be
taken to be the motivating force for the agents’ actions. Theory, seem-
ingly detached from the immediacy of actions, finds, nevertheless, in this
immediacy one of its crucial roles. It is important to note also that this
appeal to theory is not, thus, only a second-level characterization of what
political philosophy might be. Certainly, there might be many possible
characterizations of it, but in order to meet the constraints that the reso-
lution of conflicts sets, even meta-philosophy, if we might call it thus, has
to adopt a normative or practical turn. The different possible alterna-
tives we might envisage (in Rawls’ case, the abstract or general interpret-
ations that utilitarianism and intuitionism contain regarding what could
be taken to be principles of justice and their respective interpretations of
practical rationality itself, theories with which he contrasts his version
of Kantian constructivism) are to be judged according to their capacity
of being adopted by social agents the social predicament of which I
described in the previous paragraph.
The need for theory does, certainly, contain a free, detached, moment
in which a very extensive realm of possible alternatives – be they in form
of theories or of particular arguments and beliefs – can be envisaged.
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Theory – or, in Arendt’s terminology, thinking – does have this free-
standing tint. But the need for theory, as I have been suggesting it works
in Rawls’ theory, and as is suited to a more general understanding of
judgment, is framed by the severe constrictions that the demands of action
and the resolution of deep conflicts place. We should not forget that we
are dealing with practical reason. But we should neither forget that such
an appeal to theory, even as constrained as it has been and as clearly as
its tasks may have been settled, contains the shade of what is provisional
and tentative. ‘Our present theories’, writes Rawls in A Theory of Justice
speaking of moral theory, ‘are primitive and have grave defects’; we
should not, nevertheless, be paralysed by their fuzziness and complexity
but ‘we need to be tolerant of simplifications if they reveal and approx-
imate the general outline of our judgments’ (TJ, 45). The appeal to
theory, thus, is a continuous, even provisional and never closed process
that – framed in reflexive equilibrium, to which I will turn to in the next
section – ’continues indefinitely’ (PL, 97).
3 Considered judgments and reflective equilibrium
Let me now turn to the internal structure this appeal to theory has in
Rawls’ own theory. We shall see that this structure replays the reflective
process we have already envisaged and allows for a neater understand-
ing of the architecture of judgment. It seems that when we are immersed
in deep conflicts we have to discern both what the internal and external
justifications of our beliefs are, on the one hand, and what type of theory,
or set of abstract principles, might be suitable to interpret and illuminate
our very predicament, on the other. The role of this latter type of discern-
ment, I have just suggested, is to guide our actions (and concordant
beliefs) to re-sew the broken social fabric. This general characterization
of the different types of discernment involved may be sufficient to claim
that they are central elements of what, in more general terms, we take
judgment, and the faculty of judgment, to mean and what the different
strands of the Kantian heritage have taken it to mean. Discerning or
judging is, thus, a twofold enterprise. To use Kantian terminology, when
we judge we have to make clear both what maxims our actions embody,
on the one hand, and the principles under which these maxims might
be justified or corrected, on the other: we have both to justify maxims
and justify principles. Further elements are, certainly, needed to arrive at
a fully blown, post-Kantian conception of judgment, such as the capacity
of perceiving the significant circumstances and pertinent facts, the precise
discernment of what has to be taken as relevant, and the reasons why
that might be so, or the array of motivational resources that move us
to action. To some of these elements I will be returning in the last section
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of this article under the rubric of moral semantics. But the cognitive
component in judgment can be fully understood by appeal to the double
discernment I have just referred to. We have to be both concerned,
enlightened citizens and political philosophers. The important and
debated issue is how to relate these two tasks that constitute judgment.
The term ‘judgment’ narrowly refers to the proposition that embodies
an assertion or statement, and in a moment I will be referring to Rawls’
use of this meaning when he analyses our considered judgments. But the
wider meaning of ‘judgment’ I have been using, i.e. the exercise of the
faculty of judgment, allows us to see how the relationship I was asking
for at the end of the previous paragraph can be grasped in the way of
the process of arriving at such assertions. This process is the way of
linking and making congruent the twofold enterprise that was there
proposed. Nevertheless, and provisionally, it is convenient to start our
description of this process with the first meaning of judgment as it
appears in Rawls’ analyses, namely, his conception of considered judg-
ments.7 Considered judgments are assertions or beliefs we hold under
special circumstances and in relation with certain topics. These circum-
stances refer, on the one hand, to certain facts normatively appraised by
us as social agents and, on the other, to certain mental and psychologi-
cal dispositions we have and exhibit when making and holding those
judgments. Thus, considered judgments, first, take into consideration the
relevant facts; they articulate, second, the person’s normative intuitions
(as his or her previous judgments or values); and, third, are formulated
with confidence, or with no hesitation or under no pressure. In everyday
settings we could say that considered judgments show the threads of our
moral and political beliefs as we appeal to them in judging what we take
the relevant issues to be. So depicted, considered judgments are not, then,
spontaneous opinions or guesses, but meditated expressions of our moral
and political life, of our considered convictions, as Rawls also puts it. In
Rawls’ words: ‘Considered judgments are simply those rendered under
conditions favorable to the exercise of the sense of justice, and therefore
in circumstances where the most common excuses and explanations for
making a mistake do not obtain’ (TJ, 42).
Surely, considered judgments, which we know are ours, exhibit a
first-person authority; but in them a parallel awareness that they are not
everybody else’s is implied and, in certain cases, such as deep social
conflicts or when we are divided in ourselves, we might be prone to revise
them. It is important, also, to note that considered judgments incorpo-
rate, albeit not necessarily in a conscious way, normative theories that,
if made explicit, might give systematic justification to what we judge to
be the case and why we do so. For example, in debating the right to
abortion, different persons start with different appraisals, the roots of
which can be traced back, among other things, to different conceptions
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of the human life or to different interpretations of what it is to decide
about one’s body and what constrictions those different conceptions put
on our actions. Considered judgments are already, as if in a fractal, reflec-
tive exercise of judgment, condensed fragments of our diverse moral and
political standings and we normally take them for granted as expressions
of these standings. If we focus on each person’s considered judgments
and clearly lay out with her or him the systematic nature that her or his
convictions have, or might have in the light of some adequate theory,
we are making the person aware, in a process that Rawls called narrow
reflective equilibrium, of the specific architectural nature of her or his
beliefs. This process may not, normally, achieve a fully satisfactory result,
and points to the suggestion that judging what we truly believe is, also
here, a continuous process, not necessarily successful. ‘Many of our most
serious conflicts’ – writes Rawls in Justice as Fairness: a Re-statement –
‘are conflicts within ourselves. Those who suppose their judgments are
always consistent are unreflective or dogmatic; not uncommonly they
are ideologues and zealots’ (JaF, 30). Such situations of internal conflict
demand, at least locally, a further effort of judgment.
But also in situations of deep social conflict, it is considered judg-
ments which can be taken to be shattered: they no longer serve to fully
satisfy, neither in our foro interno, nor vis-à-vis other people, a commonly
appraised set of principles that could be accepted by all. But having been
formulated as part of a moral understanding that frames them – what
Rawls calls our sense of justice – we can suppose that we might be prone
to revise them in order to stitch together again the torn fabric of social
life. This can be done in various ways, but what is significant of Rawls’
suggestion is that tuning up our sense of justice in these new circum-
stances can be done via the way of making explicit the theories that might
underlie our judgments and assessing them in the light of different
alternative possibilities – and this the new, crucial, claim. With these
possibilities in vision our internal conflict or our position in the social
conflict is framed in the wider field that Kant’s extended thinking
proposed and which Arendt so clearly formulated. Not only is it more
widely framed – i.e. taking other people’s convictions and judgment into
consideration, or envisaging and imagining different alternative theories
– but it can be modified and altered. The philosophical insight that
underlies this last suggestion – which could be traced back to Stoic,
Humean and Kantian moral philosophy – is that our judgments are
dependent on concepts and that if we consciously modify those concepts
our judgments will be consequently altered. We should note that we are
already using a wider meaning of ‘judgment’, i.e. we are dealing with
the process of judging in which the citizen gets immersed when, in
philosophical reflection, he or she ponders the extent to which a debated
issue that concerns him or her alters, or should alter, his or her more
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immediate considered judgments; or, on the contrary, why and how such
assessment deepens his or her conviction in them. As I have just antic-
ipated, Rawls describes this process as wide reflective equilibrium:
[W]e regard as wide reflective equilibrium . . . that reflective equilibrium
reached when someone has carefully considered alternative conceptions of
justice and the force of various arguments for them. More exactly, this
person has considered the leading conceptions of justice found in our
philosophical tradition [including views critical of the concept of justice
itself (some think Marx’s view is an example]), and has weighed the force
of the different philosophical and other reasons for them. (JaF, 31)
As we can see, wide reflective equilibrium is another way of under-
standing the need for theory or political philosophy which we saw at
play in the first and second sections. As Rawls depicts it, it is a recurrent
mechanism in his interpretation of our cognitive predicaments in times
of conflict, in the layout of his theory, and even in the meta-interpretation
he displays of his own work. Rawls is further suggesting that building
up a theory like his – or any other that meets the demands I previously
analysed – is another step in the very same process of thinking and
judging we practise all the time. So much so that in the detailed design
of his proposal (for example, when dealing with the mechanism of the
original position, that is just a device of representation) he will repeat-
edly turn to our immediate practices of reflective judgment to make it
plausible. Thus, at the very end of TJ, summarizing the meaning of his
proposal and addressing once more some of the different philosophical
critiques to the contractarian tradition, he states:
Finally, we may remind ourselves that the hypothetical nature of the original
position invites the question: why should we take any interest in it, moral
or otherwise? Recall the answer: the conditions embedded in the descrip-
tion of this situation are ones that we do in fact accept. Or, if we do not,
then we can be persuaded to do so by philosophical considerations of the
sort occasionally introduced. (TJ, 514)
The device of the original position – the core of Rawls’ version of social
contract theory – is just a modeling procedure of the process of judging
at the two levels that I suggested articulated the exercise of judgment:
it is a representation of the process of discriminating immediate maxims
of action and of discriminating principles. We relate to that mechanism
or device as an interface between our considered judgments and the
representation of the conditions that theoretically and hypothetically
could widen them when in doubt or in conflict. And we do so with the
aim of attaining clarity and precision regarding the normative principles
we might adopt (this is the hypothetical moment) if the doubt or the
conflict were to be solved. But we look for those principles not only to
achieve hypothetical perspicuity; we strive to arrive at prescriptive
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norms or principles to adopt in order, in fact, to act as to solve our
conflictual predicament (and this is the normative moment).
We move between immediacy and abstraction, back and forth: we
envisage the device of representation and check it with our judgments,
modifying it if necessary and modifying our judgments accordingly; and,
in a mise-en-abyme, the parties themselves in the original position do the
same when they consider different alternatives to the principles of justice
they are striving to formulate – and we do the same through them. As
fiduciary figures of our moral and rational powers, the parties in the
original positions are, in a way, philosophical alter egos that mirror the
real moral egos we, as citizens, are. But also, in adopting through them
a hypothetical stance towards ourselves, towards our judgments and our
convictions, we unfold our exercise in judgment: we both are there and
here, we are both, so to say, spectators and actors in different and shifting
positions. We are spectators when we represent ourselves the arguments
and debates that our alter egos display in the original position; even we
are spectators when, from such position, we regard our real moral egos;
but we are actors because we address their arguments and, frequently
alter them, or when they force us to assess our considered judgments.
When we are able to view ourselves in this hypothetical light, we adopt
a distanced stance towards ourselves as actors; and, as actors, we check
the exact concerned distance our fiduciary spectators must take. This
unfolding, reflective process incorporates the different moments of our
faculty of judgment and shows that the appeal to theory is itself a
moment of our practical exercise of this faculty.
4 From historical experience to theory and back again
The process of judgment we have seen in action in Rawls’ analysis of
reflective equilibrium has been depicted, up to now, as a cognitive
exercise that is tailored to guide and make more precise our sense of
justice when we strive to formulate the principles that are to articulate
just institutions. These can be, thus, understood as embodying our
reflective reasonableness; but at the same time, they can be taken to be
preconditions of its exercise. Different renderings of this process are
possible, but I take it that what has been said suffices to understand
Rawls’ theory as embodying the central elements of an architectonic of
reflective judgment. I now turn to a last set of considerations that flesh
out this architectonic in a way that makes it adequate to the aim it was
put in exercise for. Although we can make a philosophical rendering of
the cognitive or motivational structure of the faculty of judgment, as we
have done in the previous two sections, judging itself is always a situated
and focused process, i.e. it operates around the relevant facts and
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normative considerations of an issue or topic. We need not understand
this circumstanced exercise in too restrictive terms. Judging is an activity
that moves across different levels of generality, to paraphrase Rawls,
and some judgments relate to particular instances, problems or conflicts,
whose understanding requires detailed descriptions and nuances. To
engage in any democratic debate in order to solve an ongoing social
conflict in our societies, or even to understand it, requires highly
developed hermeneutical and descriptive skills that tie our judgments to
these down-to-earth realities. But, at the same time, we can place these
debates and conflicts within a larger picture that widens and, if correctly
achieved, deepens our understanding of the issue in question. We, thus,
arrive at a general understanding that, nevertheless, does not withdraw
us from history and circumstance. Quite on the contrary, we tend to say
that something has historical character if we can view it within this larger
picture. The crucial debates Rawls refers to, and with which we started
to outline his way of rendering the need for theory, the long historical
debates around slavery and freedom of conscience, are examples of such
general, though circumstanced exercises. Similarly, Arendt’s search for
judgment concerning how to deal with totalitarianism and lack of
freedom refers to a type of judgment, or a set of types of judgment, that
cannot be understood if the dark times she lived through are disregarded
or forgotten.
Two things, which again parallel the dialectic of particularity and
generality we have seen at play in the previous sections, seem to inter-
twine in this understanding of judgment as a general, though circum-
stanced, exercise. In the first place, there is the set of different, contingent
historical circumstances and processes the above examples refer to. Their
maddening particularities can drown us in vertigo, so powerful are the
almost supra-human descriptive capacities needed to grasp and under-
stand them. In Rawls’ cases, we are dealing with discussions and conflicts
that went on, and are still going on, in the course of centuries and
throughout different continents; Arendt’s case of totalitarism, though
apparently more circumscribed in the time-scheme, similarly relates to
centuries-old processes, as anti-Semitism may easily show. But, in the
second place, the vertigo that these different, particular processes might
cause us is mitigated, if it does not disappear, when we are able to
place them under some type of general category – slavery, freedom of
conscience, totalitarianism – that both focuses our understanding and
enables us to formulate certain actions that relate to the issues thus
understood. These general categories – which have descriptive and evalu-
ative components – constitute what we has been called the moral seman-
tics involved in judging. They are the moral or political issues and topics
that concern us, which we take as relevant to discuss and which require
some action on our part. Certainly, as we shall see in a moment, the
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very capacity of arriving at some clarity regarding this moral semantics
– of arriving at the understanding that slavery, lack of freedom, and
totalitarianism are evils and harms to be avoided – is, itself, an exercise
of judgment, and has a similar role to the one that our ability in discrim-
inating principles plays in order to justify our maxims of action or to
the one that wide reflective equilibrium sought to achieve. Had we not
had a precise moral semantics in continuous process of elaboration, in
which concepts and sensibilities are engaged, regarding those particular
actions and institutions, we would have not understood them as what
we understand them to be now, i.e. as avoidable evils that concern us.
We could thus say that judgment is not only articulated in the twofold
cognitive enterprise of discriminating maxims and principles that we saw
in the previous section, but also that it has this third necessary component
I am referring to by the term moral semantics, a crucial component that
brings to the fore its circumstanced, historical dimension. But perhaps
we could add something even more important: the articulation of this
moral semantics is the rationale of judgment itself, at least if we take it
to mean what Rawls’ and Arendt’s need for theory is looking for, i.e. the
discriminating capacity of telling, of the issue at hand, whether it is right
or wrong. The analysis of the cognitive structure of judgment or the
layout of its tasks as a procedure aimed at decision in formulating prin-
ciples of action, does not substitute this judgment itself nor constitutes
alone a theory of justice. When we judge our situation and ponder over
its conflicts we are exercising a form of rationality that stems from our
concern with what we are facing and with the moral issue at stake. Or
conversely, what is frequently more important – as Arendt’s distressed
reflections show – judgment is an exercise of practical rationality that
shows that we should be concerned with what we leave to go unnoticed.
What I am referring to by the moral semantics component of justice,
and its historical dimension, can be illustrated again with Rawls’ two
recurrent crucial examples: the abolition of slavery and the fight for
freedom of conscience. In very different places throughout his work8
Rawls returns to these two conflicting experiences as processes in which
principled judgments we now acknowledge as being in the core of demo-
cratic societies were forged. We cannot expect Rawls to provide any
detailed analysis of the historical processes that built up these conflict-
ing experiences. Rather, his intention as a normative theorist is to show
that they could not have achieved the central normative status they have
had they not been subject to theoretical elaborations as much as they
have been the issue of institutional arrangements – and frequently they
became institutional issues because they had previously been theoreti-
cal issues. In Political Liberalism, and in characterizing his approach as
a Kantian, political constructivism that works up from judgments that
are taken as basic facts and articulates them, he writes:
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Political constructivism does not look for something for the reasonableness
of the statement that slavery is unjust to consist in, as if the reasonable-
ness of it needed some kind of grounding. We may accept provisionally,
though with confidence, certain considered judgments as fixed points, as
what we take as basic facts, such as slavery is unjust. But we have a fully
philosophical political conception only when such facts are coherently
connected together by concepts and principles acceptable to us on due
reflection. These basic facts do not lie around here and there like so many
isolated bits. For there is: tyranny is unjust, exploitation is unjust, religious
persecution is unjust, and on and on. We try to organize these indefinitely
many facts into a conception of justice by the principles that issue from a
reasonable procedure of construction. (PL, 124)
In spite of the stress here given to concepts or theories over semantics
and experience, I think it would be a mistake to take this quote to mean
that the procedure of construction – what I before termed the architec-
ture of the process of judgment – is what by itself renders the principles
of justice. Rawls is suggesting, rather, that the moral semantics of democ-
racy has to be articulated in the precise way we saw in the previous
sections: theory is needed. Thus he continues:
Further, constructivism thinks it illuminating to say about slavery that it
violates principles that would be agreed to in the original position by repre-
sentatives of persons as free and equal; or to put it in Scanlon’s way, that
it violates principles that could not be reasonably rejected by persons who
are motivated to find a free and informed basis of willing agreement in
political life. . . . Some such general characterization as this links together
the many facts such as: slavery is unjust, tyranny is unjust, exploitation is
unjust, and the rest. This is what is meant in saying that the basic facts are
not disconnected. (PL, 124)
Someone could ask how the very process of articulation that construc-
tivism achieves came into play. Here again, moral semantics comes to
help: as I started by saying, the need for theory, and its continuous
process of elaboration, was articulated in historical experiences and
debates; equally, the structure of theory is due to a continuous process
of re-elaboration. Although, as theory, it may represent itself as an
Athena, being born fully armored – that is, as theory it must present
itself in terms of internal coherence and deductive structure, if only to
favor the pedagogy or thinking and judging – we can understand its
cogent demands as having been strenuously forged in historical
discussions and debates. And these debates, again, dealt with those
specific issues I was referring to as our moral semantics. In order to
formulate and understand Scanlon’s version of the contractarian
rationale – that only those principles are justified that cannot be rejected
by free and equal persons in certain conditions of argument and desire
– we cannot disregard the very meaning some of the aforementioned
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basic facts have in order to understand what our notions of justification,
freedom or equality are. But neither should we forget that these facts
are, themselves, the result of reflective historical experiences. In the same
way that our considered judgments fractaly incorporated theories, these
basic facts contain the accumulated history of reasoning about human
freedom and about human harm. Constructivism may put under new
light these reasonings and, in doing so, may help us in making more
acute and precise our moral insights and sensibility; it can, further, be
indispensable in formulating principles that guide our actions and
straighten our institutions. But it can only do its job when and while
operating in the field of our moral semantics.
Nevertheless, this moral semantics, whose historical roots I started
acknowledging, need not, and must not, be understood in particularis-
tic terms. And not only for the reasons adduced at the beginning of this
section, but even for a further argument that might be of some interest
in times of globalization. Rawls’ use of his two crucial examples – to
which the fight against exploitation can be added – obviously takes for
granted a western, enlightened, political culture, which we tend all easily
to identify with the democratic tradition. But, first, this tradition is made
of diverse, not always congruent, strands. Not all the western nations
underwent the Reformation – and those that did, passed through very
different processes – nor all nations had to suffer a civil war that had
as one of its issues the abolition of slavery. Nevertheless, second, even
cultures that were not benefited by the Reformation, or nations that did
not have slavery as one of the central elements of their economy and their
institutions, now sustain the same principles of freedom of conscience
and the prohibition of enslaved labor. That slavery is unjust and that
the denial of freedom of conscience is rejectable are ‘basic facts’ that
pertain to our wide, contemporary moral culture. It may be interesting
to ask how such a generalization of a moral experience took place, how
it was even possible in 1949 to have the Declaration of Human Rights
signed, how its content has become part and parcel of the considered
judgments of a large part of humanity (or conversely, why is still possible
that it is not the case in many regions and cultures). The point I am
striving to make is that our moral semantics cannot be understood in a
totally particularistic spirit. Societies do in fact learn from the experi-
ences of others and a non-minor part of why it may be so gives a further
reason for the role abstractions and theories play in determining our
judgment and our sensibilities.
But in order to downplay any naïf optimism, we could continue
asking how it is possible that even those settled basic facts continue to
be so widely denied (as torture, death penalty, exploitation and discrimi-
nation show), even in democratic cultures. This question brings back
Arendt’s distress and makes her appeal to judgment absolutely relevant
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and contemporary. And similarly, in Rawlsian spirit, it gives urgency to
the appeal to a theory of justice that could adequately frame our actions
as citizens in order to shape our institutions.
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